
"KEVIN GARNETT WILL NOT RE-SIGN WITH [MINNESOTA] AFTER NEXT SEASON' Three and They're Out Ever since negotiations between the Minnesota Timberwolves and forward Kevin Garnett broke down last week, Minnesota fans have been trying to figure out who to blame. Did Timberwolves owner Glen Taylor blunder by disclosing that Garnett had rejected Minnesota's six-year, $103.5 million offer, an indiscretion that embarrassed Garnett and prompted his agent, Eric Fleisher, to declare that Garnett would leave the T-Wolves when his contract expires at the end of the season? Was Garnett, who will earn $2.1 million next year, at fault for not being satisfied with a deal that would have made him, at 21, the second-highest-paid player in the NBA, in average salary, behind Michael Jordan? Or was Fleisher to blame, for giving Garnett bad advice? The answer: none of the above. The real culprit is the system that made Garnett, about to enter his third season in the league, a potential free agent so soon. Two years ago, in response to complaints from owners and veteran players about the huge contracts being signed by rookies—the 10-year, $68.2 million deal that forward Glenn Robinson received from the Milwaukee Bucks as the first pick of the 1994 draft was the most egregious example—the league and the players' association agreed to hold down salaries with a rookie salary cap, but to allow all first-round draft choices to become free agents after their third season. The first-round picks of 1995—including Garnett, Joe Smith of Golden State, Damon Stoudamire of Toronto and Jerry Stackhouse of Philadelphia—will be the first group eligible for free agency under the new system, which is creating as many problems as it solved. Instead of risking big bucks on untested players, teams risk nurturing a player for three years only to lose him as he enters his prime. Small-market teams have the most to fear. If $17.3 million per year can't keep Garnett in Minnesota, do Milwaukee or Golden State or Toronto have any hope of keeping their top young players? The small-market franchises are in danger of becoming virtual farm teams, grooming stars for the clubs in large, opportunity-rich cities like New York, Los Angeles and Chicago. Even the young players who stand to make a windfall may find they're not happy with the new system. Garnett, for example, will almost certainly be a far wealthier man a year from now, but by rejecting the Timberwolves' offer he has set himself up for a tense season in Minnesota and has damaged the image of a fun-loving innocent that had helped make him one of the NBA's most popular players. Next time, the league and its players should be more careful what they wish for. Captain Courageous To hear the television commentators tell it, the fact that Tom Kite was able to remain on his feet, let alone finish fifth in last weekend's PGA Championship (page 28), was incredible, so crushing is the burden he carries as the U.S.'s Ryder Cup captain. Golf writers also have waxed incredulous on the pressures confronting Kite before the Sept. 26-28 Cup match in Spain, perhaps recalling the travails of recent captains. In 1995 Lanny Wadkins allowed that he didn't get a good night's sleep for a week before making his selections for the team. That same year, when Europe captain Bernard Gallacher was asked by a reporter about an upcoming pairing, Gallacher snapped, "Dammit! I take enough responsibility around here without taking that from you!" Please. If captaining the Ryder Cup is not the country-club equivalent of coaching first base, it's close; the job is not that difficult. With 10 team members receiving automatic berths based on tournament performance, the captain is left to select only the final two players. Granted, it's not easy to dis worthy peers, but choosing Fred Couples and Lee Janzen over Tommy Tolles and David Duval, as Kite did on Monday, was like choosing between premium flavors of Häagen-Dazs. During the competition, the captain assigns pairings, which does leave him open to second-guessing. Wadkins, for example, was pilloried for relying heavily on fellow Wake Forest alum Curtis Strange, who went 0-3 as the U.S. lost the Cup in '95.
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